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MONOPOLY AND MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST STANDING, 
INJURY, AND DAMAGES 
Tirza J. Angerhofer* and Roger D. Blair** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The major processors of beef, chicken, pork, salmon, and tuna have 
come under antitrust scrutiny in the last few years. What they all have in 
common is the structure of their markets. For example, meat packers buy 
cattle from a large number of cattle ranchers and sell the processed beef 
to a wide array of customers. In contrast to the input market and the output 
market, the meat packing stage is highly concentrated. Four meat 
packers—Tyson Foods, Inc., JBS SA, Cargill Meat Solutions, and 
National Beef Inc.—account for 80 percent of the business.1 Much the 
same can be said for chicken, pork, salmon, and tuna. Additionally, the 
healthcare industry and power companies may also have similar market 
structures.2 
This market structure lends itself to much mischief by the participants. 
Processors may collude in the input market, thereby acting collectively as 
would a monopsonist. Alternatively, processors may collude in the output 
market, thereby acting collectively as would a monopolist. Or they can do 
both.  
In ongoing antitrust litigation involving the beef industry, cattle 
ranchers allege that the major meat packers are depressing the prices that 
they receive for their cattle.3 At the same time, customers are complaining 
that the meat packers are raising prices for beef.4 This appears to be a 
 
* CLAS Scholar, Department of Economics, University of Florida. 
** Professor, Department of Economics and Affiliate Faculty of Law, University of Florida. We have 
benefitted from past collaboration with our colleagues Kelsey Clemons, Christine Durrance, Jeffrey 
Harrison, Jessica Haynes, Richard Romano, and Wenche Wang. We also appreciate the thoughtful 
comments of Daniel Sokol and Richard Romano. We owe a special debt of gratitude to John Lopatka for 
some much needed advice on standing and for his insightful suggestions. Finally, we are grateful for all 
the help provided by the editors of the Law Review. We thank them all but hold them blameless for what 
follows. In the text of this article, we confine our analysis to geometry. The mathematics behind the figures 
has been placed in footnotes for those enthusiastic readers who want analytical details. 
1 Victoria Graham, States Urge DOJ to Probe Meat Packers over Price Manipulation, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(MAY 5, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X9ENBS64000000?udv_expired=true. 
2 Hospitals may collude in the output market by restricting the quantity of acute care services they provide. 
At the same time, they may collude in the nurse labor market. Additionally, the case of an electric utility 
company that has monopoly power in the local distribution of electricity and monopsony power in the 
purchase of electricity has been analyzed by John D. Wilson, Mike O’Boyle, & Ron Lehr, Monopsony 
Behavior in the Power Generation Market, 33 The Electricity J. (2020).  
3 In re Cattle Antitrust Litig., No. 19 1222, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177526, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 
2020). 
4 Eleven U.S. Attorneys General encouraged the DOJ to investigate price fixing in the beef market. Press 
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classic double whammy that enriches the meat packers at the expense of 
both cattle ranchers and beef consumers. If the allegations are proven, the 
colluding meat packers may suffer a variety of sanctions.5 A similar array 
of suits has been filed against the major chicken processors.6 
In principle, the damages owed to input suppliers, who have suffered 
monopsonistic underpayments, and consumers, who have experienced 
monopolistic overcharges, can be identified quite clearly. In practice, 
separating the two creates an interesting econometric challenge.  
In order to make the exposition more tangible, this Article couches its 
analysis in terms of the allegations in the beef industry. The economic 
analysis is far more general as it informs all similar allegations of 
collusion in both an input market and an output market. Part II of this 
Article begins by assuming that the meat packers compete with one 
another in the provision of beef products and in the market for cattle.7 
Supreme Court precedent suggests that only competitors and consumers 
in the relevant market have standing to sue for damages.8 If the meat 
packers collude in the beef market, the retailers will be injured and will 
have standing to sue. But the cattle ranchers, who will also be injured, 
will not have standing to sue. If the meat processors collude in the cattle 
market, the cattle ranchers will be injured and will have standing to sue. 
Although retailers will also be injured, they will not have standing to sue 
since they are not a part of the relevant market. If, however, the meat 
processors collude in both markets, both retailers and cattle ranchers will 
have suffered antitrust injury and will have standing to sue for some, but 
not all, of the injury that they suffer.9 
 
Release, Iowa Dep’t of Justice, Miller, 10 AGs Urge Federal Investigation of Meatpacking Practices 
(MAY 5, 2020), https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsroom/meatpackers-antitrust-barr-justice. 
5 In the tuna case, Bumble bee paid a $25 million criminal fine. The government asked the Court to impose 
a $100,000 fine on Bumble Bee’s CEO and sentence him to prison for 8-10 years. United States v. 
Lischewski, No. 18-cr-00202-EMC-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51893 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020); see also 
Former Bumble Bee CEO Sentenced to Prison For Fixing Prices of Canned Tuna , U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-bumble-bee-ceo-sentenced-prison-fixing-prices-canned-tuna.  
6 Farmers allege that chicken processors, Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue, Koch, Sanderson, and others 
colluded to depress their wages with the use of Agri Stats, which disseminated important industry 
information about prices, quantity, and other things among the industry. Haff Poultry, Inc., et al. v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., et al. Case No. 17-cv-033-SPS (2017). Additionally, the chicken processors are facing private 
suits from buyers of processed chicken, such as grocery retailers and food distribution companies, who 
allege the chicken processors colluded to fix prices. In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., No. 16 C 8637, 
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36202 (N.D. III. Mar. 3, 2020).  
7 The hypothetical we employ, although grounded on allegations of misconduct, is not meant to capture 
the actual operations of meat packers or the complexities of the cattle market. Our exposition ignores 
many institutional details for the sake of simplicity. In an actual case, these may be extremely important, 
but their inclusion would make our exposition complicated without any gain in understanding of the 
problems that we are addressing. 
8 Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
9 Feinstein and Teng have observed that some antitrust cases involve both monopoly and monopsony 
issues. “If a case involves both sell-side and buy-side issues, plaintiffs and enforcers typically focus on 
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In the next Part, this Article focuses on Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
which provides a private right of action for the victims of antitrust 
violations. The critical importance of antitrust injury and antitrust 
standing is examined in the context of the hypothetical problem being 
addressed. Part III of this Article introduces collusion in the beef market 
and identifies who has standing as well as who does not. Next, this Article 
analyzes the effect of further collusion in the cattle market. Once again, 
we identify all of those who are injured and the extent of their injuries. 
Part IV begins with competition in both markets, but reverses the 
collusive sequence. Initially, collusion is introduced in the cattle market. 
Subsequently, collusion is extended to the beef market. Then, this Article 
repeats the economic analysis of sequential collusion by identifying the 
victims and the extent of their antitrust injuries. 
In Part V, this Article discusses the surprising result that the sequence 
of collusive agreements does affect the compensable damages of retailers 
and cattle ranchers, although it leads to the same welfare losses. In Part 
VI, this Article considers simultaneous, rather than sequential, 
conspiracies, and shows that the economic results are identical to those 
found earlier. That is, output price and quantity, input price and quantity, 
and the social welfare losses are the same as those emerging from 
sequential collusion. Identifying the cognizable damages, however, is 
elusive. In Part VII, this Article raises several procedural concerns 
regarding private damage suits when both monopoly and monopsony are 
present. This Article closes with some concluding remarks in Part VIII. 
II. PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Violations of the antitrust laws cause public harm, which is the 
underlying rationale for antitrust policy. But antitrust violations can also 
cause private harm to their victims. In order to provide redress for these 
victims, Congress included a right of private action in the antitrust laws. 
Specifically, under Section 4 of the Clayton Act (“Section 4”), firms and 
individuals who have been injured by antitrust violations may have 
standing to sue for the injuries they have suffered. Section 4 reads: 
“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor… without 
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
 
the former, given the straightforward story they can tell about the impact on consumers.” Ignoring 
monopsony in such cases will lead to under deterrence and undercompensation of antitrust victims. Debbie 
Feinstein & Albert Teng, Buyer Power: Is Monopsony the New Monopoly?, 33 ANTITRUST 2 (2019). 
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attorney’s fee.10” 
At first blush, this provision for private actions appears to be quite 
clear; but appearances are sometimes deceiving. As with many statutes, 
the courts have had to interpret the antitrust laws and thereby give 
meaning to what seems to be plain English. With respect to Section 4, the 
courts have put limits on who may sue for damages and have clarified the 
types of injuries that are cognizable under Section 4. 
A. Antitrust Standing 
If the phrase “any person” were read literally, private damage actions 
would be unmanageable because the effects of an antitrust violation 
ordinarily ripple through the economy. As an example, consider the 
consequences of an agreement among the country’s chicken processors to 
reduce the quantity of chicken supplied, thereby raising the price of 
chicken. Wholesalers, grocery stores, restaurants, and consumers of 
chicken would be injured as the chicken passed down the distribution 
chain. Additionally, the increased price of chicken reduces the demand 
for chicken and, therefore, injures chicken farmers, farm laborers, and 
suppliers of feed, packaging, and other inputs. It is plain to see that the 
Supreme Court had to rein in the definition of “any person” to make 
private damage actions manageable.  
The judiciary has restricted the definition of “any person” in two 
important ways. First, indirect buyers of a price-fixed good or service do 
not have standing.  Second, input suppliers do not have standing unless 
they are the focus of the antitrust violation. Consequently, in our chicken 
hypothetical, the indirect purchasers (i.e., the grocery stores, restaurants, 
and consumers) would not have standing to pursue damages under 
Section 4. Similarly, the farm laborers, chicken farmers, and suppliers of 
feed, packaging, and other inputs would not have standing.  
The elimination of indirect buyers from “any person” can be traced to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Illinois Brick Company v. Illinois.11 Its 
purpose in eliminating indirect purchasers was to reduce complications in 
proving damages when the guilty parties do not sell directly to the would-
be plaintiff.12  First and foremost, the Illinois Brick Court wanted to ensure 
that antitrust violators would be punished, thus they did not allow “pass 
on theories” that would have complicated the legal proceedings and 
reduced incentives for private enforcement.13 A defendant cannot claim 
 
10 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
11 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
12 Id. at 737. Whole new dimensions of complexity would be added to treble-damages suits, undermining 
their effectiveness if the use of pass-on theories under Section 4 were allowed. 
13 Id. at 746. “[F]rom the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/1
260 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
that part of his or her overcharge was passed on to downstream buyers. 
Nor can a plaintiff recover for overcharges that were passed on to him or 
her.14 The so-called Illinois Brick rule limits “any person” to direct 
buyers, thereby improving the manageability of private enforcement 
under Section 4. 15 
The logic of Illinois Brick seems to extend to private antitrust suits 
involving sellers who are victims of unlawful monopsony (i.e., collusion 
among buyers to depress prices below the competitive level). Before 
Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court recognized the right of sellers to recover 
antitrust damages if they suffered at the hands of a buyer cartel.  
In Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Company,16 
sugar beet farmers were allowed to sue for collusive underpayments from 
the sugar beet refiners. To be consistent with Illinois Brick, only the direct 
sellers to the colluding buyers would have standing to sue. If, for example, 
the retailers of consumer electronics collude in purchasing televisions, the 
wholesale distributors of televisions would be the direct sellers and would 
have standing. The manufacturers of the televisions would be injured by 
the collusion, but would be indirect sellers and, therefore, would lack 
antitrust standing. In price-fixing cases among sellers, only direct 
purchasers have standing to sue.17 If the conspiracy involved buyers, the 
underpaid suppliers would be the direct victims and, therefore, have 
standing to sue for damages.18 
The second way in which the judiciary has limited “any person” is by 
generally eliminating all injured parties who are outside the affected 
market.19 Significantly, this includes input suppliers. In our chicken 
hypothetical, we noted that chicken farmers, farm laborers, and suppliers 
of feed, packaging, and other inputs were injured by the collusion in the 
output market, but do not have antitrust standing, because they are neither 
consumers nor rival chicken processors who were foreclosed by the 
 
someone redresses the violation.” 
14 For a thorough economic analysis of Illinois Brick, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should 
Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule 
of Illinois Brick, 46 U.  CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979). For a contrasting view, see Robert G Harris & Lawrence 
A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U.  PA L. REV. 
269 (1979). 
15 The most notable exception to Illinois Brick involves fixed quantity, cost-plus contracts. For an excellent 
analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1717 (1990). 
16 Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). 
17 For an evaluation, see Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in 
Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1999).  
18 See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. 219. 
19 Hovenkamp has pointed out that the favored classes are customers and competitors in the case of 
monopoly. Other parties are disfavored, but on occasion, may be awarded standing. HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE,  ¶16.4b (4th 
ed. 2011). 
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monopolist’s behavior.20 In general, standing is confined to those who 
participate in the market affected by the antitrust violation.21 There are a 
number of favored and disfavored classes that have been identified by the 
courts under Section 4. In general, the favored classes, which would be 
the customers and competitors of the violator, have standing, but 
disfavored classes can be granted standing if the courts deem there is a 
practical reason for doing so.22 The most notable exception occurred in 
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, where the Court granted standing to 
a plaintiff not in the relevant market, but whose injury was “inextricably 
intertwined” with the harm to the other victims.23  
In price-fixing cases among sellers, output necessarily shrinks below 
the non-collusive level. Consequently, input suppliers suffer reduced 
sales and may be injured in an economic sense. Nonetheless, the input 
suppliers are denied standing since they are not a part of the affected 
market. In price-fixing cases among buyers, output falls with reduced 
employment of inputs. Customers in the output market would face higher 
prices and thereby be injured in an economic sense,24 but the consumers 
would be denied standing as they are not participants in the input 
market(s). There are good reasons for this limitation on standing: first, the 
courts want to eliminate claims for damages that would be difficult to 
prove; second, courts want to avoid “duplicative damages” that may arise 
if more than one party is suing for the same violation25; and third, allowing 
more plaintiffs would increase the workload of the courts, which could 
overwhelm them with damage suits. However, as we will illustrate in 
Parts III through VI below, the limitation on input suppliers produces 
some anomalous economic results.  
 
20 Other classes that have been excluded would be stockholders, landlords, creditors, truckers, among 
others. PHILIP AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 339 (Vol. IIA 
2014). 
21 Judge Posner observed in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (N.D. 
III. 2003), that “the general rule is that [input] suppliers do not have standing… to complain about a 
violation of the antitrust laws at the customer level.” In this case, Asahi was the main producer of the 
active ingredient in paroxetine, which Pentech Pharms, Inc. produced. Asahi sued Pentech because its 
market division scheme reduced output of paroxetine and thus reduced Asahi’s sales. Asahi was denied 
standing because it was an input supplier. In Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), a union was denied standing because it “was neither a consumer nor a 
competitor in the market in which trade was restrained.” In Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass’n 
of Cent. Cal., 484 F.2d 1346 (1973), agricultural workers (input suppliers) were denied standing, when 
their employers (lettuce growers) colluded in the lettuce market and consequently employed fewer 
workers. 
22 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 
¶16.4b  (4th ed. 2011).  
23 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 n.12 (1982). 
24 Whether one defines these injuries as antitrust injuries or not seems to be a matter of semantics. 
25 Supra note 22. 
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In summary, antitrust standing has been limited by the courts. As we 
noted above, the economic effects of an antitrust violation in one market 
ripple through the economy and injure many parties. Granting standing to 
all who are injured because of these ripple effects would undermine the 
manageability and effectiveness of private enforcement. Thus, the phrase 
“any person” had to be limited to cope with this potential problem. The 
courts have accomplished this in two ways. First, indirect purchasers from 
seller cartels and, presumably, indirect sellers to buyer cartels are not 
allowed to sue for damages. Second, the courts have generally excluded 
all potential plaintiffs who did not participate in the market directly 
affected by the antitrust violation,26 including all input suppliers. 
B. Antitrust Injury 
In order to have standing under Section 4, a plaintiff must have suffered 
antitrust injury. However, antitrust injury is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for antitrust standing. The Supreme Court introduced the 
concept of antitrust injury in its Brunswick decision.27 This concept is 
useful in defining compensable injuries as it limits private suits to those 
who have suffered an injury that flows from the anticompetitive 
consequences of an antitrust violation. The Brunswick Court explained 
“[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts 
made possible by the violation.”28  
The antitrust injury doctrine appears to be straightforward in practice. 
First, one must identify the anticompetitive effects that flow from a 
particular violation. Then, one must infer the logical economic 
consequences of those anticompetitive effects. If a plaintiff has been 
injured in his or her business or property due to the anticompetitive effects 
of an antitrust violation, then he or she would have suffered antitrust 
injury under the Brunswick rule. Any injury that is not a consequence of 
the anticompetitive effects of an antitrust violation does not constitute an 
antitrust injury.  Such an injury, therefore, would not be compensable 
under the remedial provisions of Section 4.  
 
26 As Hovenkamp observed, some disfavored plaintiffs are occasionally granted standing if it seems 
appropriate to do so. Hovenkamp, supra note 19. 
27 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).  For an economic analysis of 
antitrust injury, see William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to 
Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980).  In addition, see Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV.1539 (1989), and Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, The 
Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 127 (1996). 
28 Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. 477. 
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In the case of collusion among sellers, the buyers are injured by the 
illicit overcharges. In the case of colluding buyers, the sellers are injured 
due to the illicit underpayment. Antitrust injury is clear in these cases.  
C. Antitrust Damages29 
Antitrust damages serve both a remedial and deterrent function. When 
addressing the question of how to properly measure damages, courts have 
focused on damages as a means of compensating antitrust victims. If a 
firm or a consumer has paid too much for a good or service due to an 
antitrust violation, the suit will be for the overcharges.30 If a supplier has 
been underpaid as a result of monopsony power or a buying cartel, the 
supplier will be able to sue for that underpayment.31  In either case, the 
measure of damages is roughly equal to the wealth transferred to the 
monopolist from the buyers or to the monopsonist from the sellers.   
In order to deter collusion among sellers or buyers, which is unlawful 
per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the law must make collusion 
unprofitable. If the probability of detection and conviction were equal to 
one, single damages would suffice. But collusion is a clandestine affair 
and, therefore, the probability of detection and conviction is less than one. 
In its trebling provision, the Clayton Act implicitly assessed the 
probability of detection and conviction at one third.32 By trebling the 
damage award, the expected award will be equal to the actual damage. 
Presumably, this makes collusion unprofitable. 
The social welfare loss associated with monopolistic pricing measures 
the damages suffered by those consumers who did not buy the product 
because they were priced out of the market. It also captures the damage 
suffered by those who bought some of the product at the monopoly price, 
but would have bought more at the competitive price. The deadweight 
welfare loss is the net social cost of monopoly,33 but plays no role in the 
calculation of private antitrust damages. To the extent that the antitrust 
laws are supposed to improve social welfare, this focus on the wealth 
 
29 For an examination of antitrust damages, See Areeda, supra note 20, at  ¶¶ 390-99. See also ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 752 (8th ed. 2017); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Antitrust Damages, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge 
ed., 2012). 
30 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). 
31 Mandeville Island Farms v Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). 
32 Congress may have included a trebling provision as a means of punishing wrongdoers rather than 
compensating for a low risk of detection and conviction.  
33 In some cases, socially unproductive investments on the part of the monopolist to maintain their 
monopoly power would add to the net social cost of monopoly, even though it is not a part of the 
deadweight loss. For an analysis of this behavior, see Richard A. Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly 
and Regulation, 83 J.L POL. ECON. 807 (1975). 
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transfer may be viewed as a flaw in the law’s construction.  On the other 
hand, if anticompetitive pricing is deterred by requiring the guilty party 
to pay three times the overcharge (or three times the underpayment), the 
welfare loss will disappear as competitive pricing is maintained or 
restored. In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, the Supreme Court 
determined that damages would be calculated “by comparison of profits, 
prices and values as affected by the [antitrust violation], with what they 
would have been in its absence under freely competitive conditions.” 34 
In an overcharge case, the antitrust damages (△) will be the difference 
between the price actually paid (Pa) and the price that would have 
prevailed but for the antitrust violation (Pbf)
35 times the actual purchases 
(Qa): 
∆= (𝑃𝑎 − 𝑃𝑏𝑓)𝑄𝑎. 
In the case of monopsonistic underpayments, the antitrust damage (△) 
is the difference between the price that would have been paid but for the 
antitrust violation (wbf) and the price actually paid (wa) times the quantity 
actually sold (qa): 
∆= (𝑤𝑏𝑓 − 𝑤𝑎)𝑞𝑎. 
In either damage calculation, ordinary business records may be relied 
upon for the actual values, but the but for values must be estimated. In 
modern antitrust cases, sophisticated econometric methods are used to 
isolate the impact of the antitrust violations while controlling for the 
influence of other exogenous factors.36 
III. SEQUENTIAL COLLUSION I 
 We next consider the economic effects of sequential collusion 
among the meat packers in three periods. In the base period, we begin 
with competition among meat packers in the beef market as well as in the 
cattle market. This competitive benchmark provides the foundation for 
analyzing the effects of monopoly and monopsony, as well as subsequent 
welfare comparisons. In period one, we introduce collusion in the meat 
packer’s output market, i.e., beef products. The impact on beef prices and 
quantity sold, and the consequences for both retailers37 and cattle ranchers 
 
34 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). 
35 All other influences on price must be taken into account in order to isolate the effect of the antitrust 
violation(s). 
36 For a brief examination of econometrics, see Areeda, supra note 20, at ¶394. For a more extensive 
treatment, see Robert E. Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic Losses 
in Damages, in FED. JUD. CTR. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE (2000). 
37 We use retailers as the direct purchasers of beef products. Wholesalers, grocery stores, or restaurants 
may also be direct purchasers, which we ignore in this example. If wholesalers are the direct buyers, then, 
retailers, grocery stores, and restaurants may be indirect purchasers who would not have standing to sue 
due to the Illinois Brick rule. 
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are identified. We also identify the effect on social welfare. In period two, 
we add collusion in the cattle market. We examine the additional 
consequences for both retailers and cattle ranchers, as well as the impact 
on social welfare. We identify antitrust injury and damages in both 
periods one and two. 
A. Base Period: Competitive Benchmark 
If the meat packers compete in both the input and output markets, the 
price of beef will be equal to its marginal cost of production and delivery. 
38 In the input markets, the marginal value of each head of cattle will be 
equal to its price, which we denote as w. In the competitive equilibrium, 
social welfare is maximized.39 
Figure 1 shows the competitive results of the meat packers in the output 
market. The competitive price is found where marginal cost (MC1) is 
equal to the demand (D).40 Thus, the competitive price is P1, and the meat 
packers will collectively produce Q1 units of beef. Social welfare in the 
output market is maximized and equal to the triangular area, abc, in Figure 
1. Retailers experience consumer surplus of abP1 and the meat packers 









38 The profit function of a meat packers that participates in the beef market and the cattle market can be 
written as 𝜋 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝑄(𝐻, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑤 ∙ 𝐻 − ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  where π is profit, p is the price of beef, 
𝑄(𝐻, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) is the production function, H is the heads of cattle purchased, the x i are other inputs, w is 
the price per head of cattle and the wi are input prices. In order to maximize its profit, the meat packers 
will buy cattle up to the point where 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝐻 = 𝑃 ∙ (𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐻) − 𝑤 = 0. The first term on the right-hand 
side is the value of the marginal product of the cattle, which is the derived demand for cattle. If the meat 
packers collude in the beef market, the cartel profit function will be 𝜋 = 𝑃(𝑄) ∙ 𝑄 − 𝐶(𝑄) and they will 
operate where 𝑑𝜋/𝑑𝑄 = 𝑃(𝑄) + 𝑄 ∙ (𝑑𝑃/𝑑𝑄) − 𝑑𝐶/𝑑𝑄 = 0 which is the familiar condition 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. 
39 This is the First Theorem of Welfare Economics; ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, & 
JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY  549-50 (1995). This is the economic rationale for an 
antitrust policy that seeks to protect and promote competition in the economy. Courts often place a higher 
emphasis on losses in consumer welfare over losses in social welfare. 
40 We are considering a short-run model in which the number of firms is fixed. Additionally, we assume 
that this is an increasing cost industry. We assume that the price of cattle rises with increasing quantity 
which results in a positively sloped marginal cost curve (MC1). 
41 In the short-run, this surplus is equal to the meat packers’ profits and cattle rancher rents. 
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Competitive equilibrium in the cattle market is found where the derived 
demand for cattle (VMP) equals the supply (S). The competitive price and 
quantity are shown as w1 and H1, respectively, in Figure 2.  
In competitive equilibrium, the meat packers enjoy buyer surplus equal 
to area xyw1 in the input market, while the cattle ranchers’ surplus is equal 
to area w1yz. Total surplus in the input market is the sum of the buyer 
surplus and the cattle ranchers’ surplus, which is area xyz. 
11
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B. Period One: Collusion in the Output Market 
In period one, the meat packers agree to collude in the output market 
while continuing to compete in all of the input markets.42 To maximize 
cartel profits, the meat packers will restrict their collective output from 
Q1 to Q2a
43
 where marginal revenue (MR) is equal to the marginal cost 
(MC1). This output restriction will result in a price increase from P1 to P2a 
as shown in Figure 1. The consequences for retailer welfare and social 
welfare are familiar.  
Retailer welfare declines from area abP1 to area adP2a, while meat 
packer profit grows by the difference between area P2adec and area P1bc. 
The welfare gain to the colluding meat packers is smaller than the loss to 
 
42 When the meat packers collude in the beef market, but compete in the cattle market, the profit function 
can be written as 𝜋 = 𝑃(𝑄) ∗ 𝑄(𝐻, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑤 ∗ 𝐻 − ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and they buy the quantity of cattle 
where 𝜕𝜋 𝜕𝐻⁄ = [𝑃(𝑄) + 𝑄 ∙ (𝑑𝑃/𝑑𝑄)] ∙ (𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐻) − 𝑤 = 0. The first term is the marginal revenue 
product MRP of the cattle. This condition can be rearranged to 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 𝑤 or 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶. 
43 The intermediate steps are different depending on the sequence of collusion. Thus, for clarification, we 
use 2a for the monopoly to monopsony sequence (Sequential Collusion I) and 2b for the monopsony to 
monopoly sequence (Sequential Collusion II). 
12
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the retailers, which creates a deadweight loss to society.44 As a result, 
social welfare falls by area dbe. 
Based on these figures, it is clear that the retailers have suffered 
antitrust injury, since their injury flows from the anticompetitive 
consequences of a per se violation of the antitrust laws.45 At the 
competitive price of P1, retailers purchased some Q1 units of beef. At the 
collusive price of P2a, all retailers suffered antitrust injury because they 
either purchased at the collusive price of P2a or were priced out of the 
market.46 Only those retailers who continued to buy beef products at the 
inflated price, however, will have standing to sue for private damages 
since they are favored classes.47 For the retailers depicted in Figure 1, the 
cognizable antitrust damages for period one will be equal to the total 
overcharges, i.e., ∆= (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄2𝑎 , which would be trebled pursuant to 
Section 4.  
Retailers will not be able to recover damages for the beef products they 
did not buy due to high prices because of practical problems of proof. 
First, it would be difficult for an individual retailer to prove that it would 
have purchased more beef products if the prices had been lower. Second, 
even if the retailer could argue persuasively that it would have purchased 
beef products at lower prices, the problem of estimating the difference 
between its willingness to pay and the competitive price still exists. The 
injury suffered by those priced out of the market is equal to the difference 
between the demand curve and the competitive price between points d 
and b, i.e., dbi. As shown in Figure 1, the injury of each retailer who was 
priced out of the market depends on the retailer’s location on the demand 
curve. No retailer will be able to prove where it is on that segment of the 
demand curve. 
In order to make the higher price stick, the meat packers will reduce 
output from Q1 to Q2a. As a result of the decline in demand for beef, fewer 
cattle will be processed. Consequently, the heads of cattle purchased will 
decline as a result of collusion in the output market.48 This is shown in 
 
44 This loss flows from the collusive misallocation of resources: too few beef products are produced since 
their marginal value exceeds their marginal cost at the collusive output. 
45 When a business practice is invariably anticompetitive, it is deemed to be per se unlawful. Price fixing 
is the quintessential per se violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150 (1940).  
46 Those who were priced out of the market experienced welfare losses due to a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. We contend that they have suffered antitrust injury and are denied standing on other 
grounds. 
47 Hovenkamp, supra note 19, at ¶16.4b. 
48 When an output market is monopolized, the quantity is reduced below the competitive level. As a result, 
fewer inputs are employed, which suggests that input suppliers may be injured. Partial equilibrium 
analysis usually assumes away this concern. When input markets are perfectly competitive, inputs that are 
released due to monopolistic restrictions in the output market are absorbed by other employers. In the 
present paper, we deviate from this assumption. 
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Figure 2. The derived demand for cattle is no longer VMP following 
collusion in the output market. Instead, the derived demand for cattle is 
the marginal revenue product curve, which is labeled MRP. MRP is equal 
to the increase in output that a small increase in cattle purchased makes 
possible multiplied by the increase in total revenue generated by that 
increase in output.49 Setting MRP and S equal reveals that the profit 
maximizing quantity falls from H1 to H2a and the price falls from w1 to 
w2a. The surplus earned by the cattle ranchers falls from w1yz to w2avz. 
Since the loss of income was caused by an antitrust violation, one may 
argue that this is an antitrust injury. Unfortunately for the cattle ranchers, 
however, antitrust injury is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
standing. Ordinarily, standing is reserved for competitors and/or 
consumers in the market in which the antitrust violation occurred. As a 
result, the cheated cattle ranchers are out of luck. 
C. Period Two: Collusion in the Input Market  
Not satisfied with the illicit profits generated by collusion in the output 
market, the meat packers decide to collude in the cattle market as well. 
Collusion in the cattle market leads the meat packers to buy heads of cattle 
up to the point where the marginal value of the cattle (MRP) is just equal 
to the marginal increase in total expenditures on cattle (ME). Assuming 
that the supply of cattle is positively sloped,50,51 the increase in the total 
expenditure on cattle purchased, which is termed the marginal 
expenditure (ME), is equal to the price paid for an additional head plus 
the increase in prices paid for the original complement of cattle. 
For example, suppose that the positively sloped supply of cattle is:  
𝑤 = 100 + 2𝐻 
Where w is the wage and H is the heads of cattle purchased. At H=50, 
the price will be $200.00 per head and the total expenditure on cattle, 
 
49 Total revenue is price times quantity which is a function of the inputs employed: 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑃(𝑄) ∗
𝑄(𝐻1, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛). The marginal revenue product of the cattle is the change in total revenue due to the 
increase in output made possible by increased quantity of cattle purchased. 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 𝜕𝑇𝑅 𝜕𝐻⁄ = [𝑃(𝑄) +
𝑄 (𝑑𝑃 𝑑𝑄⁄ )] ∙ (𝑑𝑄 𝑑𝐻)⁄ , i.e., 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 𝑀𝑅 ∙ 𝑀𝑃.  
50 The cattle supply will be positively sloped when the reservation wage, which measures the willingness 
of cattle ranchers to sell cattle at that price, varies across individuals. When supply is positively sloped, 
the wage is a function of the heads of cattle sold, 𝑤 = 𝑤(𝐻). Total expenditure on cattle is w(H)H. The 
marginal expenditure on cattle when purchases expand by a small amount is 𝑑𝑤(𝐻) ∙ 𝐻 𝑑𝐻⁄ = 𝑤(𝐻) +
𝐻 (𝑑𝑤 𝑑𝐻)⁄ . 
51 If the supply of cattle were perfectly elastic, collusion in the beef market would reduce the quantity of 
cattle purchased, but not the price paid. The cattle ranchers who continue to sell their cattle suffer no 
injury. Arguably, those cattle ranchers who do not sell the competitive level of cattle are not injured 
because their reservation price is precisely equal to the market price. In other words, they are indifferent 
between selling a cow at the market price and not raising the cow. In a broader context, Jonathan Jacobson 
& Gary Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1991), made this 
point.  
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which is 𝑤 ∙ 𝐻, will be $10,000.00. If the meat packer expands its quantity 
purchased to 51 heads of cattle, the price will rise to: 
𝑤 = 100 + 2(51) = $202.00. 
The total expenditure on 51 heads of cattle is ($202.00)(51) =
$10,302.00. The marginal expenditure, therefore, is not the new price of 
$202.00, but $302.00, because it also includes the cost of increasing the 
price for the rest of the cattle. 
The profit-maximizing employment level is found where MRP is equal 
to ME of cattle. The price that corresponds to this quantity level is found 
on the supply curve as shown in Figure 2. The derived demand for cattle 
is MRP due to collusion in the output market. Once the cartel extends its 
collusive efforts to the cattle market, the cartel will maximize its profits 
by purchasing H3 heads of cattle where the marginal expenditure, ME, 
equals the marginal revenue product (MRP). The resulting price will be 
w3.  
In period two, the cattle ranchers have suffered antitrust injury due to 
the fall in price and quantity of their cattle purchased. They also have 
antitrust standing since they are suppliers in the affected market. Under 
Section 4, the cattle ranchers who sold cattle at anticompetitive prices will 
be able to sue for antitrust damages. Specifically, the damages (△) would 
be: 
∆= (𝑤2𝑎 − 𝑤3)𝐿3, 
which would be trebled by the court. 
In the cattle market, welfare declines from area xuvz, which results 
from collusion in the output market, to area xstz, when both collusion in 
the input and output markets exist. The surplus enjoyed by the cattle 
ranchers falls from the triangular area w2avz to area w3tz. The cattle 
ranchers have clearly suffered antitrust injury as shown by their loss of 
surplus that resulted from a per se violation of the Sherman Act and their 
antitrust damages are equal to the underpayment of the cattle that have 
been sold at anticompetitive prices. 
For meat packers without any monopsony power, the profit-
maximizing quantity of cattle purchased is found where the marginal 
revenue product of the cattle is equal to their price. Since the MRP is 
marginal revenue (MR) times the cattle marginal product (MP), it can be 
written as 𝑀𝑅 ∙ 𝑀𝑃 = 𝑤 and rearranged as 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑤 𝑀𝑃⁄ . The right-hand 
side of the equation is the meat packers’ marginal cost, i.e., the added 
expenditure on cattle necessary to expand output by a small amount. This 
is shown in Figure 1 as MC1.  
When the meat packers collude in the cattle market, the profit-
maximizing quantity is found where the marginal revenue product is 
equal to the marginal expenditure: 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 𝑀𝑅 ∙ 𝑀𝑃 = 𝑤 + 𝐻(𝑑𝑤 𝑑𝐻)⁄ , 
which can be rearranged to 𝑀𝑅 = (𝑤 + 𝐻(𝑑𝑤 𝑑𝐻)⁄ ) 𝑀𝑃⁄ . Again, the 
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right-hand side of the equation is the marginal cost, but now in the 
presence of monopsony power. It is obvious that 𝑀𝐶2 > 𝑀𝐶1 for all 
output levels since 𝑤 + 𝐻(𝑑𝑤 𝑑𝐻)⁄ ≥ 𝑤 for all output levels. This 
marginal cost is shown as MC2 in Figure 1.  
In Figure 1, we have added the marginal cost curve (MC2) that reflects 
the presence of monopsony power. The new profit-maximizing output 
falls to Q3, which causes the price to rise to P3. Interestingly, the 
cognizable damages suffered by the retailers now falls from (𝑃2𝑎 −
𝑃1)𝑄2𝑎 to (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄3because the rise in price from P2a to P3 is an 
incidental byproduct of the collusion in the cattle market. The difference 
in cognizable damages, i.e., (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)(𝑄2𝑎 − 𝑄3) becomes deadweight 
loss which is not cognizable. The retailers are neither consumers nor 
competitors in that market and thus are not one of the favored classes. 
D. Summary 
When the meat packers colluded in the beef market, they imposed 
welfare losses on both retailers and cattle ranchers. Given the limitations 
on antitrust standing, only the retailers were eligible to recover the 
overcharge damages. During period one, the cognizable antitrust damages 
were equal to the sum of the overcharges across all cartel members: ∆=
(𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄2𝑎 . Since cattle ranchers are not in the relevant market, they 
do not have standing to sue for the damages they sustained.52 The 
collusion also shifts their but for price from w1 to w2a.  
In period two, the cartel has added to its profits by colluding in the 
cattle market. Now, the cattle ranchers have standing to sue for the 
underpayment, which would seem to be the difference between w2a and 
w3 rather than w1 and w3. In general, the damages would be ∆= (𝑤𝑏𝑓 −
𝑤𝑎)𝐻𝑎 where wbf is the but for wage, wa is the actual wage, and Ha is the 
actual heads of cattle sold. Additionally, the price rose to P3 due to 
collusion in the cattle market. The retailers would not appear to have 
standing to sue for this further price increase. It should be noted that their 
damages shrink from ∆= (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄2𝑎  to ∆= (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄3.  
With competition, retailer surplus was the triangular area abP1. In 
period one, the retailer surplus was reduced to the area adP2a due to 
collusion in the output market. In period two, retailer surplus fell even 
further to the triangular area afP3 due to collusion in the cattle market. As 
for the cattle ranchers, their surplus was area w1yz when competition 
prevailed. During period one, the cattle ranchers suffered a reduction in 
their surplus to w2vz due to collusion in the output market. In period two, 
 
52 If cattle ranchers bought beef products, they could sue for those damages. However, they would not be 
able to sue for the damages due to depressed prices of cattle. 
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the cattle ranchers experienced a further reduction to area w3tz due to 
collusion in the cattle market. 
The total injury to retailers over the two periods of collusion is   
∆= (𝑃3 − 𝑃1)𝑄3. Not all of their damages are compensable, however, 
since some of these damages were realized during collusion in the input 
market. Retailers would only have standing to sue for ∆= (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄3. 
Cattle ranchers face a similar reduction in compensable damages. Their 
damages are ∆= (𝑤1 − 𝑤3)𝐻3, but they do not have standing to sue for 
the entire amount of damages. Thus, their compensable damages are 
reduced to ∆= (𝑤2𝑎 − 𝑤3)𝐻3. 
Meanwhile, meat packers retain ill-gotten gains of (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑎)𝑄3  from 
retailers and (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑎)𝐻3 from the cattle ranchers because of the 
antitrust rule that standing is confined to those who participate in the 
affected market. This appears to have perverse results and may increase 
incentives to collude.  
IV. SEQUENTIAL COLLUSION II 
In this Part, we begin again with competition in both the cattle market 
and the beef market. This time, however, the collusive sequence is 
reversed. In period one, we introduce collusion in the cattle market and 
analyze its effects on cattle prices, heads of cattle, beef prices and output, 
and social welfare. Subsequently in period two, the meat packers will 
collude in the beef market. Again, we analyze the effects on output, price, 
quantity of cattle, and social welfare.   
Competition in the cattle market results in H1 heads of cattle sold at a 
price of w1 as shown in Figure 3. This outcome results from the equality 
of VMP, which is the meat packer demand for heads of cattle, and S, 
which is the supply of cattle. The values of H1 and w1 are the same as 
those in Figure 2. Similarly, competition in the output market leads to the 
quantity, Q1, being produced at a price of P1 as shown in Figure 4. 
17
Blair and Angerhofer: Monopoly and Monopsony
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] MONOPOLY AND MONOPSONY 273 
A. Period one: Collusion in the Input Market  
The meat packers agree to collude in the cattle market.53 In order to 
maximize profits, they will buy cattle up to where their marginal 
expenditure (ME) is equal to the meat packers’ derived demand (VMP).54 
Thus, as Figure 3 shows, the quantity of cattle bought is reduced from 
H1 to H2b, where ME equals VMP. The wages are determined by the 
positively sloped supply curve, which represents the cattle ranchers’ 
reservation prices of selling cattle. Since fewer heads of cattle are being 
bought, the prices will be reduced from 𝑤1 to 𝑤2𝑏 . 
The collusive reduction in the heads of cattle bought has two effects. 
First, it creates a deadweight welfare loss due to a misallocation of 
resources. Second, it redistributes surplus from the cattle ranchers to the 
colluding meat packers. This reduction in the heads of cattle bought 
 
53 If the meat packers compete in the beef market, but collude in the cattle market, the cartel profit function 
is 𝜋 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝑄(𝐻1, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑤(𝐻) ∙ 𝐻 − ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and heads of cattle will be purchased until 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝐻 =
𝑃 ∙ (𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐻) − [𝑤 + 𝐻 ∙ (𝑑𝑤/𝑑𝐻)] = 0. The first term of the second equation is the value of the 
marginal product, VMP, and the second term is the marginal expenditure, ME. Thus, profit maximization 
results in 𝑉𝑀𝑃 = 𝑀𝐸 . 
54 The VMP curve is derived from the retailer demand for beef. 
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/1
274 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
creates allocative inefficiency because the value of the marginal product, 
i.e., the dollar value of the increased output produced by a small increase 
in employment is greater than the cost of producing that output over the 
𝐻1 − 𝐻2𝑏  interval. Hence, social welfare decreases because the benefit to 
society that does not materialize due to the reduced beef products that 
should have been created exceeds the cost of producing it. This decrease 
in social welfare is represented by the triangular area, uyv.  
Second, some of the remaining welfare is reallocated from the cattle 
ranchers to the meat packers in the form of lower prices for cattle. Both 
the loss and reallocation cause cattle rancher welfare to fall from the area, 
w1yz, to the area, w2bvz. The cartel, however, has an increase in surplus 
of the difference between xuvw2b and xyw1. They will lose some surplus 
due to the deadweight loss, which for them represents the loss in output 
and consequently, revenue, because they are processing fewer cattle. The 
increase in surplus, however, represented by w1rvw2b, more than offsets 
the loss.55 The buyer cartel, therefore, has an incentive to collude, since 
its surplus, and therefore, its members’ profits, will increase.  
Those cattle ranchers who sold cattle at the depressed prices would 
have standing to sue for their injury since it stems from a per se violation 
of the antitrust laws.56 The damages they could claim would be the 
rectangular area, w1rvw2b, which is equal to the reallocation of cattle 
rancher surplus to meat packers in the form of depressed prices. Although 
the cattle ranchers have different reservation prices, they will all be 
compensated with the same price per cattle.57 Thus, a decrease in the 
equilibrium price per head will cause a decrease in revenue for all cattle 
ranchers.  
Cattle ranchers will only have standing to sue for damages under 
Section 4 for those cattle that they have sold at the depressed prices. The 
extent of their injury is the difference between the competitive price and 
the collusive price. Thus, the damages will be equal to ∆= (𝑤1 −
𝑤2𝑏)𝐻2𝑏. The cattle that were not sold due to depressed prices also 
represent antitrust injury to the cattle ranchers. The cattle ranchers, 
however, will not have standing to sue for this injury for practical reasons. 
Most of the cattle ranchers will be unable to prove the fact of their injury, 
nor would they be able to prove the magnitude of their injury. Thus, cattle 
ranchers only have standing to sue for the rectangular area  ∆= (𝑤1 −
𝑤2𝑏)𝐻2𝑏.  
At this point, the collusion is confined to the cattle market, so only 
 
55 If this loss was not offset, the meat packers would have no incentive to collude. 
56 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar 
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), and Brunswick Co. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
57 For clarity of exposition, we ignore the fact that heads of cattle are sold at auction for a wide range of 
prices. 
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cattle ranchers would have standing. There is a substantial array of 
complementary inputs whose employment would be adversely affected. 
Some of these input suppliers include owners of breeding cows, ranch 
hands, and suppliers of feed, packaging, and other inputs, among others. 
Even though those input suppliers may be injured, they do not participate 
in the cattle market and, therefore, do not ordinarily have antitrust 
standing under Section 4. 
Monopsonistic behavior in the cattle market also negatively impacts 
the market for beef products, i.e., the output market. Since fewer heads of 
cattle are being bought, meat packers process less beef. This reduction 
will lead to an increase in the price of beef products. Figure 4 illustrates 
this result. Collusive monopsony in the cattle market causes the marginal 
cost to rotate from MC1 to MC2.
58 The demand for beef products, D, and 
MC2 are equal at an output of Q2b and a price of P2b.
59  
 
58 See Part III for an explanation of the reason behind this rotation. 
59 Readers will recall that 𝑉𝑀𝑃 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝑀𝑃 . Thus, when the price changes to P2b, the VMP curve will shift 
to the right since P2b is greater than P1. This sparks a feedback loop which causes the demand for cattle to 
rise increasing the price and quantity bought. Then the increase in quantity will cause prices to fall in the 
output market which causes a leftward shift in the VMP curve. The final equilibrium leads to a reduction 
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For the retailers, the results of collusion in the cattle market are an 
increase in price from P1 to P2b and a decrease in beef products offered 
from Q1 to Q2b. For the units of beef that they bought, those retailers are 
overcharged by 𝑃2𝑏 − 𝑃1 per unit. Since these overcharges are due to 
collusion in the cattle market rather than the beef market, the retailers will 
not have standing to sue for their injuries. These losses will be deemed 
coincidental. Since the retailers are neither foreclosed employers nor 
underpaid input suppliers, they lack standing. 
Similar to the input market, the effects of monopsony in the output 
market create a deadweight loss. This deadweight loss, represented by dbe 
in Figure 4, is equivalent to the deadweight loss in the input market and 
should not be double counted. 60 In both sequences, the deadweight loss 
represents the loss to society of a decrease in output since the marginal 
social benefit is greater than the marginal social cost at each of the points 
between Q1 and Q2b. Retailer surplus falls from abP1 to adP2b. This loss in 
retailer surplus captures both the retailers who were priced out of the 
market, (i.e., those who could not afford to pay for beef products or 
bought less beef products) which is part of the deadweight loss, and those 
retailers who had to pay a higher price for beef products, which is 
equivalent to the increase in meat packer surplus. These losses are not 
compensable under Section 4, however, because the retailers are neither 
competitors nor suppliers in the cattle market.  
B. Period two: Collusion in the Output Market  
Subsequently, suppose the meat packers in the area decide to collude 
in the output market (i.e., the market for beef products). In order to 
maximize the meat packer cartel’s profit, the production of beef products 
will be reduced to the point where marginal revenue, MR, equals the 
marginal cost, which is MC2 after period one. As shown in Figure 4, this 
results in an output of Q3, which is the same as the final output in Figure 
1. The price that corresponds to Q3 is P3, which is also the same as P3 in 
Figure 1.  
In Figure 4, the social welfare loss increases from the triangular area 
dbe in the competitive equilibrium to fbg following the reduction in 
output from Q1 to Q3. The price of beef products rises, and retailers 
purchase less of them. This leads to a decrease in retailer welfare. In 
contrast, producer surplus increases because the meat packers are 
 
in the price and quantity of cattle.  
60 In other words, the area, uyv in Figure 3 is equal to area, dbe in Figure 4. For a brief explanation, see 
Roger D. Blair & Richard E. Romano, Collusive Monopsony in Theory and Practice: The NCAA, 42 
ANTITRUST BULL., 681 (1997). 
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overcharging retailers which increases their margins. Their increase in 
surplus is equal to ∆= (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑏)𝑄3 which is equivalent to the injuries 
to retailers due to higher prices.61  
The retailers will now have standing to sue for the damages caused by 
collusion in the beef market. In period one, the collusion in the cattle 
market caused the price to rise to P2b from P1. For purposes of damages 
calculations, P2b is the but for price. As a result, the cognizable antitrust 
damages are ∆= (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑏)𝑄3. The retailers are overcharged by the 
difference between P3 and P1; but the part of that that is due to monopsony 
in the cattle market, 𝑃2𝑏 − 𝑃1, is not cognizable.  
The monopolistic behavior also has a negative impact on the cattle 
market. When the meat packers were colluding only in the cattle market, 
they bought heads of cattle where the marginal expenditure (ME) was 
equal to the derived demand curve (VMP).62 Once the meat packers began 
colluding in the beef market, however, the derived demand changed to the 
marginal revenue product (MRP). Consequently, the meat packers 
maximized their profits by buying the quantity of cattle where ME equals 
the MRP curve (Figure 3). Thus, heads of cattle purchased drop to H3. 
This reduction leads to a further reduction in the price per head from w2b 
to w3 (Figure 3). The loss in social welfare is the mirror image of the loss 
in the output market and should not be double counted. Additionally, 
cattle rancher surplus is reduced due to the lower prices resulting from the 
subsequent reduction in quantity purchased due to monopoly power. 
The cattle ranchers whose margins were further depressed would not 
have standing to sue for their enhanced injury. In fact, the compensable 
damages fall from (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑏)𝐻2𝑏  to (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑏)𝐻3 even though the 
loss in cattle rancher surplus has grown. The part of the damages that is 
due to collusion in the beef market is not cognizable because the cattle 
ranchers are neither rival suppliers nor consumers of beef. Notice that 
these damages exclude (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑏)(𝐻2𝑏 − 𝐻3), which the cattle 
ranchers would have claimed had there been only monopsony. Further 
collusion, therefore, leads to a reduction in compensable damages and 
creates greater incentives for firms to collude in both markets. 
C. Summary 
In summary, collusion among meat packers in the cattle market and 
then in the beef market leads to a reduction in price per head, heads of 
cattle bought, and quantity of beef produced and an increase in price for 
retailers. In period one, collusion in the input market reduces the price and 
 
61 The meat packers will lose hdeg when they collude, since this area becomes part of the deadweight loss. 
62 See supra note 57 for a discussion on the feedback loop caused by the change in price from P2b to P3. 
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quantity of heads of cattle to w2b and H2b, respectively. Since they are 
directly injured by the illegal conduct, they can claim ∆= (𝑤1 −
𝑤2𝑏)𝐻2𝑏. Retailers are also injured by this conduct but do not have 
standing to sue because they are not participants in the relevant market. 
This changes their but for price from P1 to P2b. Social welfare in the output 
market also decreases in this period from xyz to xuvz, leading to a 
deadweight loss of uyv. The same social welfare loss is also depicted in 
Figure 4 in the output market. 
In period two, the meat packers collude in the output market by 
decreasing the quantity of beef products to Q3. This increases the price to 
retailers to P3. Retailers can sue for ∆= (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑏)𝑄3, since P2b is the but 
for price. Cattle ranchers are also injured since the reduction in quantity 
necessitates a reduction in heads of cattle bought to H3. They, however, 
do not have standing to sue for this injury, which is (𝑤2𝑏 − 𝑤3)𝐻3. 
Welfare further declines to ustz in Figure 3 increasing the net social cost 
of collusion to syt. This calculation does not include the resources wasted 
in organizing and monitoring the cartel operations. Similar welfare losses 
are depicted in Figure 4. 
Even though cattle ranchers and retailers have suffered welfare losses 
of ∆= (𝑤1 − 𝑤3)𝐻3 and ∆= (𝑃3 − 𝑃1)𝑄3, respectively, the losses are not 
fully compensable. Those losses that are not cognizable, i.e., (𝑃2𝑏 −
𝑃1)𝑄3 and (𝑤2𝑏 − 𝑤3)𝐻3, become ill-gotten gains for the meat packers. 
By colluding in both markets, the meat packers can retain some of their 
ill-gotten gains which in turn reduces the deterrent effect of the antitrust 
laws.  
V. DOES THE COLLUSIVE SEQUENCE MATTER? 
As our analysis in Parts III and IV shows, the collusive sequence does 
not matter for the final price and quantity of beef products provided to the 
retailers or for the final price per head and quantity of cattle bought. In 
both sequences, the meat packers will produce Q3 units of beef products 
at a price P3 and will buy H3 heads of cattle at a price of w3. Consequently, 
the sequence does not matter for the magnitude of the social welfare loss. 
Figures 1 and 4 show that the reduction in retailer surplus is the difference 
between areas abP1 and afP3. Figures 2 and 3 reveal that the reduction in 
the cattle rancher surplus is the difference between areas w1yz and w3tz. 
In the end, both collusive sequences lead to the same injury. These losses 
are ∆= (𝑃3 − 𝑃1)𝑄3 in the output market and ∆= (𝑤1 − 𝑤3)𝐻3 in the 
input market. Although it seems unjust, neither the retailers nor the cattle 
ranchers have standing to sue for the full amount of their losses, because 
they are not always the injured party in the relevant market.  
When it comes to the measure of the magnitude of their damages, 
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however, the sequence does indeed matter. Cognizable antitrust damages 
for the retailers and the cattle ranchers differ between sequences. This 
difference arises because the but for price and the but for wage change 
depending on the sequence under consideration. In other words, the 
values of P2a and P2b as well as the values of w2a and w2b are different. 
Only in the most fortuitous of circumstances would P2a equal P2b and w2a 
equal w2b.
63  
This result seems anomalous, but it is due to standing rules. In sequence 
1, the but for price for the retailers is P1, the competitive price, and is 
determined by the equality of the demand and MC1 curves (Figure 1). In 
sequence 2, however, the initial introduction of monopsony changes the 
relevant curves in the output market so that the but for price, P2b, is 
determined by the equality of the demand curve and the new MC2 curve. 
Since MC2 is always above MC1, this necessarily results in a reduction in 
quantity and, hence, an increase in price such that 𝑃2𝑏 > 𝑃1. The 
difference in but for prices leads to cognizable damages for the retailers 
of (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄3 under sequence 1, but (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑏)𝑄3 under sequence 2. 
A similar consideration holds for the cattle ranchers. In sequence 2, the 
but for price per head, w1, is determined by the competitive price, i.e., 
where the VMP and supply curves meet (Figure 3). Sequence 1, however, 
shows that collusion in the output market changes the relevant curves that 
the monopsonist uses to determine the profit-maximizing reduction in 
heads of cattle bought. For this sequence, the but for wage, w2a, is 
determined by the equality of the MRP, which is derived from the 
marginal revenue curve in Figure 1 and the supply curve. Since MRP is 
always below the VMP curve, w2a will always be less than w1. 
Accordingly, the cognizable damages are equal to (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑏)𝐻3 in 
sequence 2, but (𝑤2𝑎 − 𝑤3)𝐻3 in sequence 1.  
In either sequence, the colluding meat packers will retain some of their 
ill-gotten gains. Precisely how much will depend on the specific supply 
and demand conditions in the beef and cattle markets. As if this is not 
confusing enough, the situation is worse if the meat packers collude in 
both markets simultaneously, as is shown in the next Part.  
The analysis of sequential collusion reveals some disturbing results. 
After period two, we have collusion among the meat packers in two 
markets – the market for beef products and the market for heads of cattle. 
In both sequences, the price that retailers pay rises from P1 to P3 and the 
quantity of beef that they consume falls from Q1 to Q3. In sequence 1, 
 
63 If these values were the same, the MC2 curve in Figures 1 and 4 would have to cross the demand curve 
at the same quantity level as the point where MC1 and MR cross. This same logic also applies to the input 
market represented in Figures 2 and 3. w2a and w2b will only be the same if the heads of cattle bought 
where ME meets the VMP curve (H2b) is the same as the heads of cattle bought where S meets the MRP 
curve (H2a). These equalities are not likely. 
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only part of the price increase is due to collusion in the beef market, P2a-
P1 (Figure 1) and, therefore, the retailer’s compensable damages would 
be limited to (𝑃2𝑎 − 𝑃1)𝑄3. The injury caused by collusion in the cattle 
market, which is equal to (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑎)𝑄3, is retained by the meat packers 
as ill-gotten gains since the retailers do not have standing to sue. Similarly 
in sequence 2, only part of the price increase is due to collusion in the 
beef market, 𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑏  (Figure 4), and, therefore, the retailer’s 
compensable damages would be limited to (𝑃3 − 𝑃2𝑏)𝑄3. The injury 
caused by collusion in the cattle market, which is equal to (𝑃2𝑏 −
𝑃1)𝑄3, is retained by the meat packers as ill-gotten gains since the retailers 
do not have standing to sue. Those retailers on the demand curve between 
𝑄1 − 𝑄3, who were priced out of the market or bought less beef are out of 
luck.  
In both sequences, we see that prices per head fell from w1 to w3 and 
heads of cattle bought fell from H1 to H3. In sequence 1, depicted in Figure 
2, if their suit is successful, the cattle ranchers will recover (𝑤2𝑎 − 𝑤3)𝐻3 
in damages. The reduction in price per head from w1 to w2a is attributable 
to collusion in the beef market and, therefore, is not compensable. As a 
result, the meat packers will be able to retain (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑎)𝐻3 as ill-gotten 
gains. Similarly, Figure 3 shows that for sequence 2, cattle ranchers will 
recover (𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑏)𝐻3, if their suit is successful. The reduction in price 
per head from w2b to w3 is attributable to collusion in the beef market and, 
therefore, is not compensable. As a result, the meat packers will be able 
to retain (𝑤2𝑏 − 𝑤3)𝐻3 as ill-gotten gains. The cattle ranchers who did 
not sell the cattle between 𝐻1 − 𝐻3 due to the depressed prices are out of 
luck since they do not have standing. 
VI. SIMULTANEOUS COLLUSION 
So far, we have analyzed sequential collusion among meat packers in 
the beef market and the cattle market. We have also seen that the 
cognizable damages are not the same from one sequence to the other. This 
raises another question: what happens if collusion is simultaneous in the 
two markets? The brief answer is that the equilibrium price and quantity 
in the beef market and price per head and cattle bought are the same as 
those resulting from sequential collusion. The retailers’ cognizable 
damages and those of the cattle ranchers, however, will be complicated to 
isolate. 
Suppose that the meat packers in the local market form a cartel that 
fixes prices in the beef market and price per head in the cattle market. The 
cartel will restrict output and buy fewer heads of cattle in order to 
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maximize cartel profits. 64 
Prior to the cartel formation, the meat packers operated where the 
demand for beef (D) was equal to supply (MC1). As shown in Figure 5, 
the competitive price was P1 and the corresponding quantity was Q1. In 
order to maximize cartel profits, the meat packers will produce where the 
marginal revenue (MR) equals the marginal cost (MC2), which is the 
supply of cattle that has been affected by the exercise of monopsony 
power. The cartel solution is P3 and Q3. The monopoly overcharge 
appears to be 𝑃3 − 𝑃1. The retailers appear to be entitled to recover 
antitrust damages of (𝑃3 − 𝑃1)𝑄3 . Arguably, however, this sum 
overstates their cognizable damages because part of this is due to output 
restrictions induced by collusion in the cattle market, for which they 
would not have standing. 
 
 
64 With collusion in both the beef market and the cattle market, the cartel’s profit function will be 𝜋 =
𝑃(𝑄) ∙ 𝑄(𝐻,, 𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑤(𝐻) ∙ 𝐻 − ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Collusion in the beef market is captured in the revenue 
term, 𝑃(𝑄) ∙ 𝑄, while collusion in the cattle market is captured in the expenditure term, 𝑤(𝐻) ∙ 𝐻. The 
solution to the maximization problem involves buying H3 heads of cattle at a price of w3 and selling Q3 
units of beef at a price of P3. 
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 Under competitive conditions, the quantity of cattle bought and the 
price per head were determined by the demand, i.e., the value of the 
marginal product (VMP) curve, and supply (S). The pre-cartel input 
quantity of cattle was H1 in Figure 6 and the corresponding price was w1. 
In order to maximize cartel profit, the cartel will buy heads of cattle where 
the marginal revenue product (MRP) is equal to the marginal expenditure 
(ME). This is shown in Figure 6. The cartel solution is w3 and H3, which 
suggests antitrust damages of (𝑤1 − 𝑤3)𝐻3. As with the apparent 
damages in the output market, this measure of antitrust damages arguably 
overstates their magnitude because part of the reduction in the price and 
quantity is due to collusion in the output market. 
 There are additional complications and interesting policy questions 
when the meat packer cartel colludes simultaneously in both the beef and 
cattle markets. The end results will be the same for price and output and 
for input prices and quantity. The impact on the welfare losses will also 
be the same as it was for sequential collusion. Issues of standing and 
damages, however, become cloudy.  
Plaintiffs could certainly argue that the pre-conspiracy price and wage 
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were P1 and w1, respectively, while the collusive price and wage are P3 
and w3. Consequently, the most reasonable measures of damages are 
(𝑃3 − 𝑃1)𝑄3 and (𝑤1 − 𝑤3)𝐻3. To the extent that these measures of 
cognizable antitrust damages are somewhat imprecise, this burden 
properly falls on the wrongdoer.65 Additionally, there would be no 
duplication of damages. 
If a court permits retailers to recover the full overcharges and permits 
the cattle ranchers to recover their full underpayment, there will be no ill-
gotten gains. There will, of course, be the same welfare losses because the 
economic results are the same.  
Defendants may argue that the retailers are only entitled to recover part 
of the apparent overcharge and the cattle ranchers are only entitled to 
recover part of the apparent underpayment. But the defendants would 
have to argue that the apparent damages overstate the cognizable damages 
by confessing that they had colluded in the beef and cattle markets. This 
is obviously not an attractive argument. To find the correct compensable 
damages would be no small feat. As we saw in the preceding Part, the 
compensable damages are not unique since they depend on the collusive 
sequence. Estimating cognizable damages under either sequence would 
be extremely bothersome. If it could be done, defendants might suggest 
averaging the two estimates. Other than simple convenience, however, 
there is no principled basis for using the average.  
VII. PROBLEMS IN LITIGATION 
Collusion in both the output market and one of the input markets raises 
a number of complicated issues. Some of them are procedural and some 
of them are economic. 66 The implications of this Article’s analysis raises 
a number of complicated civil procedure issues. This Article discusses 
some of the issues that may arise, but does not presume to resolve the 
questions that they pose.  
First, consider the case of sequential collusion. This would seem to 
involve two separate offenses under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
(“Section 1”) and, therefore, two separate antitrust cases that involve the 
same defendants. Private plaintiffs would have to file separate suits 
because the interests of consumers and input suppliers are not completely 
aligned. Rulings in one case may conflict with rulings in the other case. 
In addition, the compensable damages differ depending upon the 
 
65 Areeda, supra note 20, at  ¶390. The plaintiff is entitled to draw a just and reasonable inference. The 
burden of any imprecision correctly falls on those whose conduct creates the need for the inference in the 
first place. Note, however, that a stab in the dark is not a just and reasonable inference. 
66 For the most part, the issues that we raise here are legal rather than economic matters. Consequently, 
we raise these questions but do not attempt to answer them. 
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sequence. Moreover, with no change in demand or costs, the compensable 
damages change during the period of collusion. In principle, those 
complications can be sorted out, but in practice the issues will be hotly 
disputed. The estimation of damages for both consumers and input 
suppliers must control for changes in the determinants of demand and 
costs. 
Second, consider the analysis of simultaneous collusion. Is this a single 
Section 1 violation or two? If it is a single violation, defining a class 
would be problematic since it is at least questionable whether “proof for 
one is proof for all.” If it is two violations, the measure of damages will 
be complicated by the fact that the overcharge in the output market is due 
in part to collusion in the input market and vice versa. Arguably, both the 
overcharges experienced by the consumers and the underpayments 
suffered by the input suppliers are overstated due to existing standing 
rules. Isolating the proper measure of damages will be extremely 
complicated.  
Settlements are the norm in antitrust cases. With either sequential or 
simultaneous collusion, there would seem to be two classes. The presence 
of two class actions will complicate settlements because the defendants 
cannot require certain accommodations from the plaintiffs. For example, 
if one class is prepared to treat some evidence as confidential, that will 
not prevent discovery in another case. In the end, the courts decide how 
to interpret the laws. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the economic consequences of collusion in both 
the output market and one of the input markets by a single cartel. In doing 
so, it has uncovered several interesting, albeit disturbing, results. First, 
when the cartel engages in collusion in the output market first and 
colludes in the input market second, the cognizable antitrust damages 
differ from the situation where collusion occurs in the input market first 
and then in the output market. Second, the extant standing rules permit 
the cartel to retain some of its ill-gotten gains generated in both the output 
market and the input market. Our analysis of sequential and simultaneous 
collusion reveals that the current antitrust standing rules permit the 
wrongdoers to retain some of their ill-gotten gains. Put differently, the 
standing rules deny compensation to some parties that suffered antitrust 
injury. This is troubling because there is no easy remedy. 
If input suppliers were granted standing under Section 4 of the Clayton 
Act, a single violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act could result in a 
tidal wave of private damage actions. For example, suppose that the 
automobile manufacturers engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy. In 
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addition to claims by the dealers, there could be claims by all of the parts 
suppliers. It would not seem feasible to consolidate those claims into one 
big class action since there would be inevitable conflicts within the class.  
Third, when the collusion occurs in both markets simultaneously, the 
proper measures of damages for consumers and input suppliers cannot be 
determined unambiguously. This outcome stems from the fact that 
collusion in the output market impacts the input market and collusion in 
the input market has an impact in the output market. 
In summary, this Article has shown that with current standing rules, 
collusion in both the output market and one input market leads to ill-
gotten gains to the meat packers. This weakens both the remedial and the 
deterrent effects of Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
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